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Abstract 
Unaccompanied asylum-seeking children in the United 
Kingdom approach adulthood knowing that they will be 
encouraged or even forced to return to their countries of 
birth. Drawing on a project that promoted voluntary 
return to Afghanistan, we use interviews with twelve young 
people, professionals working in the Home Office and in 
education, local authorities, and voluntary-sector agencies 
to describe a complex area of immigration policy. We show 
how the state’s obligations as “corporate parent” clash with 
increasingly punitive migration controls and with growing 
political scrutiny of public spending. We propose education 
as a way to prepare young people for futures as global cit-
izens in either country of settlement or of origin. 
Résumé
Les enfants non accompagnés demandeurs d’asile au 
Royaume-Uni évoluent vers l’âge adulte sachant qu’ils 
vont être incités ou même forcés à retourner à leurs pays 
d’origine. En nous basant sur un projet qui encourageait 
le retour volontairte à l’Afghanistan, et à l’aide d’entrevues 
avec douze jeunes personnes, ainsi que des professionnels 
du ministère de l›Intérieur du Royaume-Uni (Home Office), 
des professionnels de l’éducation, des autorités locales, et 
des agences du secteur bénévole, nous dressons le portrait 
d’un domaine complexe de la politique en matière d’im-
migration. Nous montrons comment les devoirs de l’État 
dans son rôle de « parent institutionnel » se heurtent à des 
restrictions de plus en plus sévères sur la migration et à 
une attention politique intensifiée portée sur les dépenses 
publiques. Nous proposons l’éducation comme moyen de 
préparer les jeunes pour un avenir en tant que citoyens du 
monde, que ce soit dans les pays d’installation ou d’origine. 
Introduction and Context
In the United Kingdom, local authorities (LA), which include ports of arrival or asylum-screening centres, are responsible for the care of unaccompanied asylum-
seeking children (UASC) arriving in their area. Kent County 
Council (KCC), in the southeast corner of the United 
Kingdom, covers the Port of Dover, so is responsible for a 
relatively large percentage of the United Kingdom’s asylum-
seeking children. The strategy document for Kent 2015–16 
estimated that by March 2015, KCC would be caring for 365 
UASC, representing 20 per cent of the overall care popula-
tion.2 The increase in numbers of applications during the 
summer of 2015, however, has resulted in KCC now caring for 
over 720 unaccompanied children and having to open two 
new residential units to support new arrivals.3 State support 
for children in care in the United Kingdom can continue 
into adulthood, and the Children (Leaving Care) Act 2000 
(CLCA) and the Children and Family Act (2014) protect care-
leavers. These young people can become classified as Appeal 
Rights Exhausted Care Leavers (ARECL) after reaching 
eighteen if their application to extend their temporary leave 
to remain in the United Kingdom (and subsequent appeals) 
fail. At this stage they risk detention and enforced return 
and, if a formal human rights assessment determines they 
have no further right to support in the United Kingdom, 
they can lose accommodation and support. For these young 
people, their status as adults refused protection trumps their 
claims as care-leavers and they face destitution, detention, 
and enforced return. Many are unwilling to return volun-
tarily and, even after their refugee cases have failed, actively 
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seek fresh evidence and other means to prolong their stay in 
the United Kingdom. A significant proportion of UASC sup-
ported by KCC are from Afghanistan, a dangerous country 
undergoing political, social, and economic transition but 
one the UK government considers safe enough for migrants 
whose refugee or humanitarian claims have failed. This is 
despite evidence from the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM) and others4 and the widely reported com-
ments of the Afghan minister for refugees and repatriation, 
Hussain Alami Balkhi, who (cited by the Home Office 
themselves)5 stated a desire to renegotiate memorandums 
of understanding on returns with European countries to 
reflect the deterioration of security in Afghanistan.
The UASC population in Kent, as in the rest of the United 
Kingdom, includes girls and young women, but they are far 
fewer than boys and young men. Girls are almost always 
placed in foster care, unlike boys who are fostered only if 
found to be under sixteen. Girls are also less likely to be 
returned. For reasons of political and professional sensi-
tivity, data on UASC are hard to access, and published data 
do not disaggregate ARECL numbers from the general 
data on people supported under adult support provisions 
or returned to Afghanistan. There is a sharp demarcation 
between the treatment of asylum-seekers determined as 
either over or under eighteen and they have access to very 
different services.6 The abrupt change in immigration cat-
egory from child to adult also means that it is difficult if 
not impossible to follow the progress of care-leavers into the 
adult system. 
The United Kingdom’s emphasis on return as a dur-
able solution for UASC reaching adulthood is in line with 
Europe-wide policy, but forced return of young people 
remains unpalatable to the public and thus problematic 
for policy-makers. Return, or repatriation, is one of the 
UNHCR “durable solutions” to refugee movements, empha-
sizing voluntary movement and a return “home.”7 For many 
young people, however, return to countries of birth does not 
equate to return to a “home,” as many feel that their home is 
now their country of asylum.8 Returnees may have retained 
few ties, and family members may have been lost or killed, 
and the empirical evidence noted by Lemberg-Pedersen 
highlights “that family tracing in Afghanistan is all but 
impossible.”9 Other young people will have been born out-
side Afghanistan in refugee camps in Iran or Pakistan. In 
addition, returnees may be mistrusted and alienated,10 and 
this further prejudices the futures of young people lacking 
valuable local connections and skills. Nevertheless, EU gov-
ernments including the United Kingdom insist that return 
is the best option for these young people as, being judged 
without grounds for protection, they have been found ineli-
gible to remain in the countries where they have grown up. 
Returning young Afghans to Afghanistan was also seen by 
some of our interviewees to have a symbolic significance for 
the United Kingdom, as it demonstrates the government’s 
power to effect repatriation. In the context the United King-
dom’s military involvement in Afghanistan this was seen as 
important by some. 
This article draws on an evaluation of a return initiative 
carried out by the authors11 that targeted over 100 ARECL. 
The Positive Futures Project intended to encourage ARECL 
young Afghans to volunteer for AVR by giving them a 
return package enhanced with extra training and skills 
that would be useful once back in Afghanistan. The project 
was designed by a partnership that included representatives 
from the LA, the Home Office Assisted Voluntary Return 
team, the Immigration, Compliance and Enforcement (ICE) 
team, as well as voluntary sector agencies and a local Fur-
ther Education college. Project funding was through the 
Return and Reintegration Fund (RRF). Ultimately it was 
unsuccessful, as none of the targeted young people agreed 
to return and take up the training offered, but the project 
raises fundamental issues for projects encouraging return 
as a “durable solution” for former UASC. It questions how 
UASC are educated and supported, how their connections 
to countries of origin are managed, how immigration cases 
should be handled, and most importantly how the needs of 
young people—for safety, belonging, and secure futures—
can be assured. We argue that the marked unwillingness 
of this small group of young people to engage with efforts 
to encourage their return has important national and inter-
national implications. Service providers responsible for the 
care of UASC and policy-makers seeking durable solutions 
for young migrants without secure immigration status need 
to rethink their treatment of this vulnerable group.
Legal Frameworks and Asylum Decision-making 
in the United Kingdom
The processes by which young people are refused asylum 
and made ineligible for leaving care provisions have been 
well documented,12 and the Office of the Children’s Com-
missioner’s recent report explicitly examines two areas 
of problematic policy: the representation of UASC cases 
and their transition into adulthood.13 Warren and York 
reviewed the cases of twenty young people refused asylum 
and concluded that legal representation was often ineffect-
ive and inadequate.14 Gladwell and Elwyn summarize 
the issues facing unaccompanied asylum seeking Afghan 
children in the United Kingdom,15 and they identify the 
discretion in the system (to withdraw or continue support 
for example) and the specific issues affecting young people 
considered Appeal Rights Exhausted (ARE). These issues 
include their increasing vulnerability as support is cut, as 
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well as problems with age determination. The age of a child 
as determined on arrival will determine the services to 
which he or she is entitled and, ultimately, the date when 
he or she will become subject to removal.16 Appeals against 
removal can be based on ongoing legal judgements, such as 
the KA ruling in July 2012,17 which found a systemic breach 
of the duty to endeavour to trace parents. Such legal chal-
lenges raise new grounds for appeal, and “fresh claims” can 
always be submitted if there is a material change in a per-
son’s case, such as evidence from country of origin or chan-
ges in personal circumstance. For example, the safety of 
chartered removal flights to Afghanistan is being currently 
challenged.18 Such disputes, shared and discussed among 
young people on social media, raise their hopes for the 
reassessment of cases. However, the increasing limitations 
on access to legal aid under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO), means that get-
ting representation to restart cases and for judicial review 
has become increasingly difficult. In addition, changes to 
immigration rules in relation to article 8 of the ECHR—the 
Right of Private and Family Life—means that even starting 
a family in the United Kingdom may not be sufficient to 
prevent removal. 
Voluntary Return Schemes
The UK government, in line with most receiving countries, 
emphasizes voluntary return schemes, and these, including 
AVR, which provides some material support for reintegra-
tion, are intended to allow migrants to return with some 
dignity. AVR schemes include an element of cash support 
as well as further support offered in-kind, in-country. This 
second element is intended to promote reintegration and 
a “sustainable return” that will discourage returnees from 
simply moving on to another country. “Pay-to-go” schemes 
such as AVR are run all over the world and are controversial 
to the extent that their “voluntary” nature can be disputed 
in cases in which migrants would prefer to stay but have 
little realistic alternative to return.19 The UK Home Office 
representatives we interviewed for the evaluation were 
categorical that the “voluntary” nature of its voluntary 
return programs is paramount, yet others of our inform-
ants saw voluntary return as a “least-worst” option for many 
migrants. 
At the time of this project, AVR schemes in the United 
Kingdom were provided by Choices, a program run by the 
Refugee Action charity. Choices, whose services are closing 
on 31 December 2015, had a long record of providing impar-
tial support for migrants considering return and had run ser-
vices funded by the Home Office. Choices processed appli-
cations, provided pre-decision counselling and outreach 
schemes, and informed and assisted migrants considering 
return. They did not operate to targets, and their remit has 
always been to support decision-making rather to advocate 
any course of action. The successor to Choices as provider of 
voluntary return services has not yet been announced but is 
unlikely to be as independent or as supportive of its clients. 
AVR in the United Kingdom is no longer available to people 
in detention, and its absence again ratchets up the pressure 
on people facing detention, destitution, and deportation. 
The Home Office promotes voluntary departure schemes for 
migrants who may have overstayed and who wish to regu-
larize their situation and potentially return to the United 
Kingdom later. Such schemes are clearly inappropriate for 
refugees who fear persecution in their countries of origin, 
and offering them to former asylum-seekers was construed 
by some informants as testament to the culture of disbelief 
that surrounds asylum claims and claimants.
“Return” in an Afghan Context
Gladwell and Elwyn consider the mechanisms involved in 
return and discuss why the young people in their study were 
so reluctant to take up offers of AVR.20 Their participants 
feared returning to a dangerous and unfamiliar environ-
ment where they felt they would have little chance of a 
future. Young people interviewed were not interested in 
the money or the support offered as part of AVR, and some 
saw absconding as an option, preferring to live below the 
state’s radar without support to avoid enforced return. This 
desperate option was regarded as tenable by some, as they 
saw the United Kingdom as basically a safe country, even 
for people without rights to remain, unlike the alternative 
of Afghanistan. 
Forced return is usually preceded by detention, and 
Gladwell and Elwyn describe how, when one young person 
was detained and/or returned, friends and acquaintances 
were more likely to drop out of the system.21 A clear pic-
ture emerges that young care-leavers do not want to return 
and will fight to stay in the United Kingdom. Many can-
not imagine a future in Afghanistan, and the continuing 
state of unrest evidenced from multiple sources, including 
Facebook and social media, makes return a frightening 
prospect. Young people may have loose social networks that 
connect them back to countries of origin and to migrant 
communities,22 but they are still likely to be considered 
as outsiders in Afghanistan. Returning empty-handed is a 
further problem, especially for young men whose families 
may have invested heavily in getting them out of the coun-
try in the first place. Generalized insecurity and poverty in 
Afghanistan are also reported as problems for young people 
who have grown up in safety and relative affluence; their 
perceived Westernization may also cause them problems. 
Gladwell and Elwyn refer to assumptions that returnees 
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are wealthy (and therefore worth kidnapping), involved 
with foreign agencies, and/or ideologically aligned with 
the West.23 Schuster and Majidi’s research identifies three 
factors that inhibit sustainable return once removed to 
Afghanistan:24 deep economic loss, lack of transnational 
ties, and shame of failure, compounded by community sus-
picions of “contamination.” 
There are few educational opportunities open to returnees 
in Afghanistan, and finding employment in Kabul is difficult 
without family connections and/or advanced skills. Literacy 
in Dari and Pashtu was also important, and an informant in 
Kabul stated that “a returnee has to be above and beyond a 
young person who has been to high school and college here.”25 
The long-term outcomes for returnees post-deportation are 
likely to include psychological damage, and it is clear that 
many returnees leave Afghanistan to seek safety elsewhere.26 
Along with Morocco and Iraq, Afghanistan was identi-
fied in 2011 as the target of an EU-level drive to find durable 
solutions through the return of UASC. The European Return 
Platform for Unaccompanied Minors (ERPUM) aimed to 
develop reception centres in countries of origin and empha-
sized family reunification and tracing to reconnect children 
with their families and communities. It has been argued, 
however, that part of its failure “stems from normative 
questions concerning the illiberality of deportation powers 
as such”27 and that the forced return of children remains a 
sensitive and controversial area of law. The ERPUM projects 
(I and II) were funded at the EU level and aimed to “develop 
new methods for organizing family reunification and 
return for unaccompanied minors that need to return after 
receiving a final rejection of their asylum application.”28 
Thus ERPUM and the Positive Futures project, while at very 
different scales, had similar goals—to repatriate young asy-
lum-seekers whose claims for protection had been judged 
unfounded. ERPUM failed because of bureaucratic difficul-
ties and because of the political sensitivities of EU govern-
ments returning children. The Afghan Ministry for Refu-
gees and Repatriation was unwilling to offer much support 
for the project, partly as the result of limited funding for 
accepting children whose safety they could not guarantee. 
The Positive Futures project discussed here failed directly 
because the young people refused to engage with and could 
not trust AVR without assurances of security and without 
adequate family tracing. Two elements—legal and bureau-
cratic barriers in sending and receiving countries—com-
bined with the active objection to return by asylum-seekers 
and their advocates are likely to affect all future projects. 
The Positive Futures Project 
Positive Futures was initiated because of the growing num-
ber of ARECL young people in Kent. The project recognized 
the group’s need for pre-return skills and training, not least 
as some ARECL have had little education in the United King-
dom. It had two elements: preparation for training and the 
training itself. Crucially, the terms of project funding and 
the participation of the Home Office meant that potential 
trainees had to apply for AVR before becoming eligible for 
the training course. The original evaluation plan intended 
to involve the young people in ongoing discussions about 
the project—how they felt about it, their situation in the 
United Kingdom, and their proposed return to Afghan-
istan. As it turned out, the project was over almost before it 
began as, although great efforts were made to engage ARECL, 
through their case workers, open days, and a week of pre-
project study skills, none of the nine Afghan young men 
who attended these sessions agreed to sign up for AVR and 
join the Positive Futures project. During the whole evalua-
tion (the pilot and the main project) we spoke to twelve 
ARECL young people, eight caseworkers working directly 
with the ARECL, and twelve members of the steering group, 
including representatives of the Home Office, Immigration 
Enforcement, project staff, and four experts with experi-
ence working with ARECL. The data collection design was 
approved by the University of Kent Ethics Committee, and 
the full evaluation has been published online.29
Throughout our interactions with these young unaccom-
panied refugees we struggled to avoid the traps created 
by the administrative categories devised by immigration 
status and tried to focus on the young people as individ-
uals. Arriving as unaccompanied children, they lack a 
family to contextualize their experience. Focusing on their 
lives as UASC, or ARECL, therefore, risks essentializing them 
and underestimating their individuality and their local 
and international connections. This research sought to 
present the views of people whose voices are rarely heard 
and whose experience represents a reality that mainstream 
society does not want to acknowledge. We were able to 
engage in a reflexive process to develop an understanding 
of individual experiences that gave meaning to their social 
reality. Nevertheless, there are ongoing concerns about the 
role of researchers and humanitarian advocates working 
with asylum-seekers and refugees, which include the pos-
sibility of colluding with practices that work against the 
human rights of informants.30 Research on deportation and 
removal could fall into this trap. 
As stated above, this research is based on the experience 
of a small number of young people, as is common in projects 
seeking to engage potential returnees. We had no access to 
a larger data set, and young people without secure leave to 
remain are generally acknowledged to be hard to reach.31 
We situate the experience of a small number of young 
people within a wider research field that has resonance 
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for policy-makers internationally who struggle to support 
former UASC facing return to countries of origin. We aim 
to faithfully reflect the views of this small group of young 
people as expressed to us in a setting in which confidenti-
ality was assured and where participants understood that 
we were impartial and unconnected to Social Services, the 
Home Office, or any other official agency. 
Lessons from the Project: A Lack of Educational 
Opportunities 
These UASC had had varied educational opportunities in 
the United Kingdom, as their routes into education were 
affected by many factors—not least their age assessment on 
arrival. Children placed in foster care are likely to receive 
more support and encouragement to study than those 
assessed as over sixteen and housed in semi-independent 
accommodation. These older children were, at the time, 
over the age for compulsory schooling so may not have been 
offered mainstream education. The local area is over 89 per 
cent white32 and schools are inexperienced at working with 
children with additional languages; they are reluctant to 
take on teenagers new to the UK school system. Many UASC 
in Kent have received education from a voluntary organisa-
tion funded by the LA that provides twenty hours of teaching 
per week in English, everyday maths, British culture, and 
some vocational skills. This is unlikely to meet the needs of 
the UASC, who arrive with little education and are unpre-
pared to join mainstream schooling. Education provision is 
just one way that support for UASC differs across the United 
Kingdom, as in other British LAs, education post-sixteen 
has been more comprehensive.33
Several of the young people interested in joining the 
project were functionally illiterate in their own language 
so were at a serious disadvantage when learning English 
or vocational skills. That said, they were enthusiastic about 
having a chance to study at a Further Education (FE) college. 
Our conversations and the reports written for the evalua-
tion by the trainer and the keyworker show how the young 
people were very positive about participating and they were 
eager to learn. The poor mental health status of these young 
people, however, should not be overlooked. Worry and anx-
iety undermined their learning and shortened their atten-
tion span. One stated, “We are slowly going mad.” They told 
us they could not sleep at night and were tired during class. 
Sleep disturbance was, in part, due to fear for the future and 
of night-time raids by the ICE teams but also may relate to 
pre-migration and flight experiences. 
Education is valued highly in Afghanistan, and we heard 
that nothing short of a degree would allow a young person 
to return with dignity and a good chance of a livelihood. 
Indeed Schuster and Majidi state, “Where those deported 
are seen as shamed or contaminated, access to such net-
works may be withdrawn. Without networks to offer sup-
port and employment opportunities, integration into a 
community is almost impossible.”34
The young people we spoke to were motivated in part by 
the project’s promise of some respite from reporting and 
from being detained and forcibly removed. One said, “The 
good thing that they say to us is that you don’t need to go 
sign and that Immigration and the Police can’t touch you 
because you are going to this course—that is exciting. We 
can walk free, we can go out free. We don’t have to worry too 
much like we used to be. But we are still thinking—what’s it 
going to be after three months? Same again—but at least we 
can breathe for three months.” 
Lessons from the Project: AVR and Young Care-
Leavers from Afghanistan 
The young people we spoke to were clear that return was not 
an option for them, and they stressed that the original rea-
sons they left their homes still remain. They were also clear 
that they had often been told by their caseworkers about 
AVR and that they had discounted it. “We know about it! If 
you want to go back you can go but we don’t want to—we 
come here from 2009 and we know about this stuff—we got 
a problem how can we go back?”
The Home Office’s preferred option for ARECL remains, 
however, AVR. The alternatives—forced return or voluntary 
departure (by which migrants leave without support pack-
ages)—are both undesirable and in the case of forced return, 
expensive and traumatic for all involved. Our interviews 
with ICE made it clear that forced return is complex and 
involves locating and detaining young people. Enforcement 
raids are potentially public and traumatic events. The Home 
Office has a clear interest in keeping in touch with the young 
people so that they can note the progress of cases as well 
as keep their information systems up to date. A key indica-
tor of the success of the Positive Futures project, from the 
Home Office’s point of view, was that engagement encour-
aged young people who had not been reporting to re-present 
themselves and thus to place themselves back within the 
state’s purview. 
AVR is a contested subject, and we heard views from stake-
holders ranging from those who saw it as a positive option 
to those who opposed it as a form of quasi non-voluntary 
removal. There was a majority view, however, that AVR is 
unlikely to be an attractive option for this group of young 
people because of their age and their sincere fear of return. 
This reluctance to volunteer to return was reinforced by 
their continuing hopefulness that they would be able to 
legitimize their stay in the United Kingdom. Some we 
spoke to felt that age and gender mattered and a masculine 
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attitude to risk meant that, in their situation, “You’d take 
your chance” rather than accept voluntary return. Another 
informant considered that conditions in the United King-
dom, although not easy, were so much better than those in 
Afghanistan, that no amount of pressure or incentive would 
be enough. 
Lessons from the Project: AVR and Incentive to 
Return 
The project was not an incentive for any of the ARECL to 
apply for AVR. What was offered—training and the highest 
rate of financial reintegration support—did not outweigh 
their fears. When they met the Choices team at the end of 
the preliminary week, the young people, who had not fully 
understood that they must commit to return to receive the 
training, left the program, and those we were able to speak 
to were angry and very disappointed in how things had 
turned out. We were told, 
We were thinking we can go to college, we can do anything, we 
can learn, but then they said we must sign and go back. I know 
that … I’ve been in detention, I know that every single day about 
this thing, they can give some money and you can go back to 
Afghanistan to live there—what am I going to do with that money 
if I haven’t got family? If I go somewhere and they see me I’ve got 
money, they lift from me, and get money from me, they might kill 
me as well. I’ve got problems as well, I’ve got problem with that 
people as well—if they find me out, they are not give me a chance. 
It’s not right.
His friend continued, “Those people, they are not going 
to listen to you, they are going to shoot you. It’s not like 
England!” 
This and other data collection exercises35 has shown 
that while their lives are very hard in the United King-
dom—being disqualified from education and employment 
and threatened with detention, homelessness, and destitu-
tion36—it is still a great deal better than what they expect to 
find in Afghanistan. As the report on a UK Border Agency 
and Foreign and Commonwealth Office workshop acknow-
ledges, the “push factors” at the disposal of the Home Office 
are rarely enough to change a young person’s mind: 
Push factors include: the prospect of detention and enforced 
removal (although there are differing views as to how much this 
prospect influences decisions); the lack of options or opportun-
ities in the UK; the tightening of immigration laws (including 
moves to further limit legitimate migration); destitution—some-
times triggering the need to resort to unlawful activity in order to 
survive; and a mismatch of reality with optimistic, or even mis-
guided, expectations of life in the UK prior to arrival … However, 
compelling factors such as destitution can limit the individual’s 
ability to engage with long-term considerations and planning for 
return.37 
Our discussions with experts within and outside the steer-
ing group indicates skepticism about the appropriateness 
of AVR for ARECLs. Some service providers involved in this 
project felt that AVR should be presented to young asylum- 
seekers as soon as they arrived in the United Kingdom, 
while others were reluctant to bring up the subject for fear of 
implying a lack of confidence in the young person’s asylum 
claim and their right to be in the United Kingdom. Finding 
the right time to raise the delicate issue of returning “home” 
is difficult. Our conversations with young people illustrated 
that while they were clear about AVR as an option, they had 
not realized how tightly enmeshed it was within the project. 
This failure of communication led directly to the collapse 
of the project, as while members of the steering group were 
clear that openness and honesty with the young people was 
paramount, the centrality of AVR had been downplayed. 
Within the general skepticism about the appropriateness 
of voluntary return for this group, we heard the view that 
former asylum-seekers will take up AVR only once they had 
reached a point when return feels desirable or inevitable. 
These young people have not reached this point and are 
genuinely afraid of what is waiting for them in Afghanistan 
and still hoping for leave to remain at “home” in the United 
Kingdom. 
There were discussions about the levels of support offered 
to returning migrants and of the ratio of cash to payment-
in-kind. We heard that few migrants return because of 
the financial incentive and that Afghanistan is not short 
of tradespeople or training programs. We were told by an 
expert, “Vocational training is not enough, there are loads 
of training-providers in Afghanistan. Lots of people know 
how to do these things who have networks and contacts 
and don’t have the disadvantages that returnees have—it’s 
helpful to the extent that any training is helpful but not the 
critical factor that will change things unless it was linked 
to completely reliable and verified job-creation services—
that’s the only way it would have made a difference.” 
Conclusions: Returning Young Unaccompanied 
Asylum-Seekers
We have described some of the reasons, common to many 
receiving countries, why projects seeking to return young 
unaccompanied people to countries of origin voluntarily, 
fail. Without wishing to promote the option of return, we 
recognize that some young people’s best interests would be 
served by a genuinely informed and sensitively arranged 
return, to at least “test the water” in their countries of origin. 
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The final section of this paper thus considers what the Posi-
tive Futures project taught us about how such an option 
could be designed.
Comprehensive Training and a Bigger Project 
The young people involved in this project made it clear that 
return was not an option for them. The majority of the steer-
ing group, however, felt that return was in the best interest 
of the child and that developing pre-return packages had 
some value. While it was inappropriate for this group of 
young people, we feel that some young people, from coun-
tries that are safe and developing, could benefit from pre-
return training packages. There are therefore some general 
lessons to draw from this project. 
Several steering group members felt that the length of 
time allotted to the project was too short. Insufficient time 
was allotted to gain the trust of the young people, to find 
out about their needs, to build links in countries of origin, 
and to accustom them to the situation that they would face 
there. The terms of the funding and Home Office’s concerns 
that a longer course might act as a pull factor for more asy-
lum claimants limited the project, but there was a common 
feeling that the lead-in time was too short and the training 
too superficial to be valued by the young people. In the case 
of the Afghan young people, however, they challenged the 
idea that any kind of training could be sufficient to persuade 
them to return.
During the evolution of the project, from an idea before 
2012 to a funding application in 2013, the project became 
less ambitious. The originators of the project attempted to 
engage agencies working in Afghanistan to explore what 
the options for returnees might be. They consulted the IOM, 
who have significant links in Afghanistan and who provide 
support for returning migrants, on the sorts of skills that 
were likely to be useful on return. They built links with 
organizations such as Afghan Action and the Afghan Pro-
fessionals’ Network. A more extended program could have 
allowed the young people to think, talk over their options, 
and settle into preparatory study without having to com-
mit to return. After this introduction, they could choose 
a course of study that would suit them and give them a 
realistic chance of work on return. Staff at the FE college 
spoke of how the young people were uncomfortable in the 
classroom; they arrived late, found it hard to concentrate, 
and were excited but suspicious of their unfamiliar sur-
roundings. Staff felt that e-learning techniques, including 
Skype, could have allowed them to access learning in an 
environment where they felt comfortable. They could have 
overcome their nervousness and fear of being “trapped” at 
the course while building skills and familiarity with the col-
lege. This approach would also have been more cost effective 
and a “softer introduction” to learning for young people liv-
ing chaotic lives. 
In the current political climate, a comprehensive course 
of study is unlikely to be politically acceptable, but we argue 
that the fears that prevent funding—that such a course is 
a “pull factor” and that investment should not be made in 
people ineligible for support in the country—are not insur-
mountable. We find no evidence to support the belief that 
a course would act as a pull factor, and, given the cost and 
political sensitivity of detention, forced removal, and des-
titution, interventions supporting return could be justified 
on financial grounds and certainly on ethical grounds. 
A “Cultural” Approach to Supporting UASC and Young 
People 
Introducing voluntary return to young people when they 
are facing the loss of their support from social services is 
too late. We heard from the young people themselves and 
many other parties that they were too scared and too angry 
to accept return and AVR at this late stage. 
An alternative approach could be to introduce the option 
of return much earlier in care planning. Training and sup-
port for social workers who have to balance the tension 
between care and immigration matters is critical here.38 
Careful and sensitive handling is needed to ensure that AVR 
is presented as genuinely voluntary and a positive choice. 
Such an approach could run alongside the provision of good 
and equitable educational opportunities in mainstream UK 
schools leading to British qualifications. Education could 
include mother-tongue classes, which would support learn-
ing generally and help young people develop a sense of pride 
in their own heritage. It could encourage a sense of belong-
ing and biculturalism that would allow them space to think 
positively about returning to Afghanistan. 
For the young people we spoke to, Afghanistan is 
not “home”; home is where they have grown up, and they 
know nothing about their country of birth. Most of them 
have few if any connections to draw on, and those who do 
are unlikely to admit to them for fear they will be used 
to force them back. Connections and social networks in 
Afghanistan could be promoted from the United Kingdom, 
and family-tracing services could be used proactively and 
independently of immigration processes to develop the few 
links these young people have. Such a cultural approach 
is in line with Elaine Chase’s findings39 and the “Life pro-
jects” approach discussed by Matthews.40 This approach, 
connected to Article 3 of the UNCRC and developed by the 
Council of Europe,41 aims to promote the best interest of the 
child and the future prospects of all concerned with their 
welfare and protection. Matthews writes, “The Committee 
of Ministers envisages life projects … as being implemented 
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either in the host country or in the host country and in 
the country of origin or in the country of origin or, in the 
specific case of family reunion, in a third country in which 
the parents are lawfully settled.” 42
Equipping young persons with cultural skills appropri-
ate to a future in the United Kingdom as well as in their 
country of origin surely has great potential for supporting 
them to be truly contributing citizens wherever their lives 
take them. 
Changing the Political Climate
Funding for ARECL remains contentious. Local authorities 
are financially responsible for providing care (subject to a 
human rights assessment), while the Home Office’s role is as 
an enforcement agent. The resulting tension over financial 
liability needs to be resolved if more holistic approaches 
to the care and support of ARECL are to be achieved. We 
find it disturbing that a group of young people who have 
already experienced disruption, loss, and disadvantage in 
their short lives should be treated as a burden rather than as 
potential contributing members of society, whether in the 
United Kingdom or in Afghanistan. Writing ten years ago, 
Blitz, Sales, and Marzano argued, “Domestic interest based 
arguments, rather than those founded on the protection 
of human rights, appear to be driving the policy-making 
agenda. Thus returns are portrayed as a means of reliev-
ing the burden on Britain’s social services, and as a means 
of placating a public opinion and media that has become 
increasingly hostile to immigrants and asylum seekers.”43
This observation has become only more striking in the 
intervening years. While we argue that not enough has 
been invested in the care and education of UASC before they 
reach eighteen, we find it unethical and counterintuitive not 
to support their transition into adulthood, either through 
allowing them to work or through meaningful education or 
training programs. Our reflections on the Positive Futures 
project highlight some of the complexities experienced by 
Afghan ARECL. The project attempted to tackle one area 
of this complexity through an innovative approach, but 
the project failed, we would argue, because of the political 
climate in the United Kingdom and beyond. Afghan care-
leavers are well aware that asylum decision-making is not 
equivalent across Europe, and we heard examples of young 
people leaving the United Kingdom clandestinely and gain-
ing refugee status elsewhere. Even in this small sample 
within one local authority, these young people have had an 
inconsistent experience, with fostered children better able 
to access mainstream education than those supported in 
independent housing. 
Government policy on migration controls still privil-
eges neo-classical models of “push and pull” to explain 
and understand the motivations of migrants and refugees, 
despite academic research that now generally accepts push-
pull theories as outdated and unhelpful in predicting migra-
tion decision-making.44 Conversations with steering group 
members made it clear that the project design was driven 
largely by funding streams that insisted on a strong “push”—
obligatory application for AVR before Phase Two, combined 
with a weak “pull”—enough to get the ARECL into the class-
room but not enough to encourage new asylum-seekers 
into the country. This project failed, as have other projects, 
because it did not recognize that young people seeking 
safety in the United Kingdom are active agents who will 
strive for their own best interests, which they perceived to 
be served by remaining in their UK home, not in countries 
of origin.45
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